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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
C:TATF: OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 19132

JAKP. POTEET, a/k/a ELMER LAVERN
POTF:F:T,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Jake Poteet, appeals his convictions of
Aggcavated Assault, a thicd degcee felony,

in violation of

Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-103 (1978), and Bail
Jumping, a thicd degcee felony,

in violation of Utah Code Ann.

76-8-312 ( 1978).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In a jucy tcial held Febcuacy 28, 1983 and Macch 1,
"983 in the Sixth Judicial Distcict Couct of Gacfield County,
State of Utah, the Honocable Don V. Tibbs, Judge, pcesiding,
appellant was tcied on chacges of Aggcavated Assault,
Aggtavated Robbecy, and Attempted Cciminal Homicide.
found appellant guilty of Aggcavated Assault.

The jucy

In a sepacate

luty tcial held Macch 11, 1983 in the same couct, appellant
was found guilty of Bail Jumping.

On Macch 31, 1983,

appellant was sentenced foe each of the above offenses to

serve consecutive terms of not more than five yeaL-s in th<:
Utah State Prison and to pay a fine of SS,000.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions
below.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was convicted of Aggravated Assault for
the brutal beating of Rodney Jones in a motel room in
Escalante, Utah on Halloween weekend

in 1981.

The victim, Rodney Jones, was a mechanic for Lamb
Engineering & Construction Company, working near Escalante
(Tl. 122, 277) .1

The victim received his weekly paycheck in

the amount of $765.67 on the afternoon of Friday, October 30,
1981 and cashed the paycheck that same afternoon at the Bank
of Iron County in Escalante (Tl. 123-129, 277-278,

391).

Because his pickup truck was not running properly, Jones took
a room at the Circle "D" Motel in Escalante instead of
returning to his home in Arizona (Tl. 137, 280, 302-303).

1 The transcripts and records shall be referred to as
follows:
"Tl."--transcript of trial of case no. 2914 he::.n
February 28 and March 1, 1983; "T2."--transcript of tria::. of
case no. 2985 held March 4, 1983; "T3." transcript of
Arraignment and Preliminary Hearing foL case no. 108
December 9, 1982; "T4."--transcr:ipt of Arraignment and
Preliminary Hearing for case no. 109 a::.so held December 9'
1982; "T5."--transcript of Ar:raignment foL- case nos. 82-92
held November 25, 1981; "Rl."--record of case no. 2914; an<l
"R2."--record of case no. 298S.
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The nexl day, Oclober 31, 1981, Jones apparently
telephoned Larry Poleel, appellant's cousin (T2. 105), and
asked Larry lo help him repair his pickup truck (Tl. 292, 300,
11s, 452).

Larey was wocking as a mechanic at an Escalante

gas slalion (Tl. 452).

Larey testified that he went over to

the Circle "D" Motel at appcoximately noon on Saturday,
October- 31, 1981 and worked on the victim's truck for an hour
(Tl. 453-454).

Larry related that after they finished, Jones

invited him into his motel coom for a few drinks (Tl.
454-455).

As Lacry was about to leave, appellant and his

bcothers Gary and Billy drove up, apparently having noticed
Lacey's pickup truck parked in the motel parking lot.
invited them in.
laughed.

Jones

Larry testified that they all drank beer and

After a few minutes, Larry left.

Appellant, Gary,

and Billy left approximately ten minutes later (Tl. 456-457).
Appellant and his brothers went to the Apache
Lounge, a bar, in Escalante just before 2 :00 p.m. on October
31, 1981 (Tl. 236).
at the bac (Tl. 475).

Appellant's uncle, John Poteet, met them
A few hours later, appellant and his

bcothers were involved in a disturbance at the bar (Tl.
237-238, 320).

The owner of the bar, Joseph Schow, persuaded

them to leave (Tl. 239).
The four Poteets then returned to the Circle "D"
Motel (Tl. 201, 212, 369-370, 475).

Appellant parked his

Pick up truck in front of Room 1, narrowly missing the open
door of a pickup truck owned by Gary Bruno (Tl. 212-213).
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The

Poteets got out of their pickup truck and began hattassing
Bruno and his friends Teri:y Thayne and Dennis BaLnes (Tl. 20J,
213).

Appellant did most of the talking, calling Btuno "gav"

and "queer" because Bruno had long hait (Tl.
220-222).

213-214,

Appellant said they were looking foe some

construction guy staying at the motel.

Appellant also said

something about harming a local policeman named Mosier (Tl.
215).

Thayne and Barnes testified that appellant and the

other Poteets appeared to have been dcinking

(Tl.

203, 214).

Appellant and the other Poteets then drove down to
the other end of the motel and packed their pickup truck out
in the middle of the parking lot in front of Room 12, which
was Jones's room (Tl. 136, 139, 20fi-20 7

,

216-217, 404).

The

Poteets got out of the pickup truck, left both ti:uck doors
open, and went

into Room 12 and brutally assaulted Jones (Tl.

140, 218-219, 322-323,

367).

Jones testified at trial that he

only remembers lying on his bed and seeing four men standing
over him, beating him (Tl.

281, 298, 305).

One of the

assailants told Jones, "We'd better not heat: any moi:e about
this or we'll get you"
unconscious (Tl. 282,

(Tl.

286).

The assault left Jones

3fi3, 422).

Shortly thereafter, at approximately 5:15 p.m. on
October 31. 1981, Officec Donald Mosier saw the Poteets parked
in front of the Apache Lounge (Tl. 323).

Officer Mosier had

been informed of the earlier disturbance

in the bar involvinq

the Poteets (Tl. 320-321).

He told the Poteets that the

-4-

haLmaid did nol wanl them in the bac anymoce (Tl. 322-323,
173).

,,f you"

Appellanl ceplied, "I have a 30-30 which will take cace
(Tl. 324).

Offic<=c Mosiec testifed that the Poteet's

apptat<=d lo be intoxicated (Tl. 324).
Appcoximalely an houc and half latec, Joseph Schow,
th<= own<=r of the bac saw appellant, his two brothecs, and his
uncle standing in front of their pickup truck outside the bar
and overh<=ard appellant say to his uncle, "We God Damn sure
tor<= that coom up, TV and all"

(Tl. 240-248).

Schow went to

find Offic<=c Mosier to cepoct what he had heard (Tl. 247).
At approximately the same time on the evening of
Octob<=r 31, 1981, the owners of the Ciccle "D" Motel, Joy and
Danny Reid, noticed on the switchboacd that the telephone
light for Room 12 was on, indicating that the phone was off
th<= hook (Tl. 142, 156, 170, 192-196).

The telephone in Room

12 did not work for outside calls (Tl. 137, 192).

Joy Reid

looked out and saw that Room 12 was dack (Tl. 143).

The Reids

to wait until the next mocning to check into the
matter further,

thinking that Jones was eithec out of his room

or asleep (Tl. 143, 170-171).
The next day, Sunday, November 1, 1981, at
appt·oximately 11:00 a.m., the cleaning girls told Joy Rein
that lhey were unable to clean Room 12 since Jones was still
inside (Tl. 144).
The t

Joy walked down to Room 12 and knocked.

e was no ces ponse.

h<=ard a muller-.

She knocked again.

Th is time she

She opened the unlocked door and saw Jones

-5-

lying on the bed cove red with blood.

She also saw that

television set was on the floor and that the hed had
broken (Tl. 144, 159).

Frightened, Joy ran back to the

motel's office lo gel her husband,

Danny (Tl. 148, 160, 166,

171).
Danny Reid went to Room 12 with his wife Joy, and
saw Jones lying on the bed with blood all around
171-172).2

(Tl. 149,

Danny returned quickly to the office to gel his

Kodak Inslamatic lo take photographs for insurance purposes
(Tl. 146-147, 150, 172-173).

After Danny took the

photographs, Jones told Danny that he, Jones,

knew who had

assaulted him, but Jones did not tell Danny who it was (Tl.
179, 182-183).
184).

Danny went to get Officer Mosier (Tl. 149,

Joy had gone to telephone an Emergency Medical

Technician {"E.M.T.") {T2. 149, 188, 32R, 408).
Danny located Officer Mosier at chut-ch al
approximately 11:45 a.m., November 1, 1981 and told him of the
assault {Tl. 150, 186, 325,

376).

Mosier went home and put on

his uniform, and Danny returned to the mole:!.

(Tl. 3 26).

When

Danny arrived back at Jones' s room, Jones was on his

and

knees looking for a $100.00 bill he had hidden in the zippered
compartment of his money belt (Tl. 186-187, 198, 282-284).

2 There was blood on the television set, the mirror, the
carpel, the bedding, the pillows, the air: conditioner, the
walls, and the ceiling as well as on the victim (T2. 144-145.
15 0-151 ' 16 2-16 3 ' 16 6 ' 171-1 7 2 ' 191. 2 5 s ' 3 27 ' 3 8 4- 3 8 6 ) .
Before the assault, Room 12 had been neat and orderly (Tl.
145, 158, 200, 211-212)
-6-

Danny helped Jones back onto the bed (Tl. 187).

The money

belt was offered into evidence at trial (Tl. 283).

The

stitching ai:ound the zippered money compartment had been
ripped apart (Tl. 284).

The $100.00 bill was never found (Tl.

18 7).

Officer Mosier arrived at the motel just before
noon, November 1, 1981 (Tl. 376).

Mosier, a certified E.M.T.

(Tl. 408), entered Jones's blood-splattered room and examined
Jones.

Mosiei: testified at trial that Jones's pulse was weak

and his breathing was shallow.

Mosier furthei: testified that

Jones had a deep cut over his left eye, a bloody nose, and
dded blood in his mouth, ears, haic, and beard (Tl. 327, 345,
406).

Mosier asked Jones if he knew who had assaulted him.

Jones replied affirmatively.
who it was.

Mosier asked Jones to tell him

Jones was reluctant (Tl. 328).

Jones faded in

and out of consciousness (Tl. 328-329, 345).

When Jones

became coherent again, Mosier repeated his questions (Tl.
329).

Jones again was reluctant but finally told Mosier that

the Poteets had assaulted him and robbed him of $600.00 to
$650.00 (Tl. 329, 349, 360).

Mosier found Jones's empty

wallet in Jones's pants pocket (Tl. 316, 360, 400).
Officec Mosier went immediately to the Poteet's
rented home.

Re did not obtain a warrant foe theic arrest

because he feared that Jones would soon die or lose
consciousness from his injuries (Tl. 343-345).

Mosier's feac

was based on his observation of Jones's shallow bceathing,
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weak pulse, and vacila ting cohenence, and on the amount of
blood splatter-ea thcoughout Jones' s motel coom (Tl. 130,
343-345, 3Rfi, 406).

Officer- Mosier- also believed that

appellant and the other Poteets wece ti:ansients living in
Escalante only temporadly and that as such they might leave
town before he could obtain a war-cant (Tl. 343-345; TS. 11).
Mos ie c ac rived at the Poteet ces ide nee be tween 12
noon and 12:30 p.m., Sunday, November 1, 1981, and asked
appellant, his uncle John, and his brothecs Gary and Billy to
come outside to answer some questions (Tl. 330-333, 349-350,
478).

Mosier read them their Micanda eights and each

individually responded that he under-stood and was willing to
talk (Tl.

333-336, 351-352).

accusation.

Mosier- informed them of Jones's

The Poteets denied involvement, but agceed to go

with Officer Mosier to the Circle "D" Motel to see whether
Jones could identify them (Tl. 337, 352-354).

Mosier- anested

the four- men for questioning then dcove them to the motel
338, 340-343, 403).
While Officer- Mosier- was at the Poteet residence,
Carl Davis, an E.M.T. and a Peace Officer- Catagory II (Tl.
252-253, 270-272, 410) arcived at the Ciccle "D" Motel to
attend to Jones' s injucies (Tl. 149, Fil,

254, 355).

at trial, described Jones as "one bloody mess"

Davis,

(Tl. 254).

Davis cleaned the dried blood from Jones's mouth, nose, and
eyes with a wacm towel to help Jones's bceathing (Tl.
255-256).
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When Mosier arrived back at the motel with the
poteets, Davis told Mosier that Jones needed to be taken to
the hospital,3
258-259).

Mosier asked Davis to stay a minute (Tl.

Mosier had the Poteets line up in front of the

motel's swimming pool fence directly across from Room 12,
handed his backup revolver to Davis, and went to assist Jones
to the door of his motel room (Tl. 152-153, 165, 189, 259-260,
266-267, 287-288, 338, 355-356, 396, 479).

Officer Mosier

asked Jones if he recognized any of the men as his assailants.
Jones said, "yes", and pointed to Billy Poteet.
Jones if any of the others were involved.

Mosier asked

Jones replied,

"those two," pointing to appellant and Gary.

Jones said he

recognized only those three (Tl. 287-289, 292-294, 339,
356-358, 397-399, 403).4

Mosier asked Jones whom he

recognized as his assailants several times in different ways
in an effort to confuse Jones.

Jones's identification of

appellant, Billy, and Gary was consistent throughout the
questioning (Tl. 339-340, 359, 398-399).
Officer Mosier arrested appellant, Billy, and Gary
for assault, advising them again of their Miranda rights, and
released John Poteet (Tl. 154, 190, 359-360, 399, 479).

David did not call for an ambulance.
He assumed that the
E.M.T.'s who drove the ambulance were unavailable, otherwise
he would not have been called to the scene (Tl. 257).
4 Jones stated at trial that he remembers four assailants
in his room at the time of the assault but remembers only the
lhree persons at the emergency field identification by the
pool fence (Tl. 292-294).

Davis arranged for a co-worker of Jones to take Jones to the
hospital in Panguitch, Utah just before 3:00 p.m. Novembet l,
1981 (Tl. 155, 262-264, 429-410).
Dr. E. Terry Henrie was Jones's attending physician
at the Garfield Memorial Hospital
419-420).

in Panguitch, TJlah (Tl.

He testified that when Jones was admitted to the

emergency room, Jones was in a serious state.
his face, hair, and beard.
bruised.

He had blood on

His face and left eye were

Both of his ears wen: bruised and very lender.

He

had a small skull fracture, and he was somnolent--he had
difficulty concentrating (Tl. 4W-421, 428, 43l-432).

,Jones

knew who he was, but not where he was or what the date was
(Tl. 4 22, 4 39) •
Dr. Henrie diagnosed Jones as having suffered a
concussion and a contusion of the brain (Tl. 423).

Dr. Henrie

testified at trial that Jones was in danger of death by
aspiration of his vomit while unconscious (Tl. 424).

Dr.

Henrie further testified that Jones's injuries were blood
trauma caused by a beating with a fist, foot, or knee rather
than a sharp object, and that these injuries were compatible
with, and in his opinion caused by, an assault such as the one
alleged by Jones (Tl. 4 27-4 28).
During the first week of November, 1981, sever:al of
Jone's co-workers were very upset by the assault and
threatened to take the law into their own hands (T2. 81).
There was talk of "blanket parties " (restraining a person in
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a blankel wh.i.le healing him) and of running the Poteets out of
Escalanle (T2. 80-82, 105-106, 109, 112-113).
however, i l

appears f com lhe record

Significantly,

that none of the Poteets

were ever direclly lhrealened (T2. 107, 109-110, 114).
Moi:eover, Officer Mosier lestified that the intense feelings
in lhe communily soon subsided when il was seen that he was
laking care of the matter (T2. 82).
Jones was discharged from the hospital on November
10, 1981 (Tl. 286, 425-426).

Dr. Henrie testified that upon

release Jones was free of pain but his mentation and memory
were slill impaired.

Jones was unable upon release to compute

correclly "serial sevens"

(successive subtraction of the

number "7" from the resulting difference of the previous
calculation, beginning with the number "100").

Jones also was

unable to remember events prior to November l, 19Al (Tl. 426).
At trial, Jones testified that his memory was still "spotty"
(Tl. 28 7).
At the December 10, 1981 Preliminary Hearing,
appellant, Gary, Billy, and John Poteet5 were all bound over
for trial and ordered to appear for arraignment on January 7,
1982 (T2. 74-75, 90-91, 99; T3. fl-9, 14).

All four were out

on bail of $10,000.00 each (T2. 75; TS. 26).

Just prior to

Chrislmas 1981, Officer Mosier learned that appellant had
moved his family from Escalante, ostensibly in response to

1 John Poteet was later rearrested after his release at the
emecgency field identification (Tl. 480).
-11-

the rumors of "blanket parties" which had

in early

November (T2. 75-77, 87, 92-93; T3. 15-19, 23; Rl. 45).
Appellant failed to appear: at the JanuaLy 7, 1982 an·ai']nmenl
heai:ing as oi:dei:ed and his bail was i:eset at. $200,000.00 (T2.
92-93, 98-99; T3. 10,16; Rl.

20-21).

The Galfield County

Shei:iff's Department subsequently i:eceived an anonymous
telephone tip that appellant was in Los Sanchus, California
(T2. 77, 88, 93; T3. 10, 20-21).

Appellant was arrested in

San Luis Obisbo, California on January 13, 1982 (T2. RR, 94;
T3. 10).

He refused to waive extradition and was not returned

to Utah until April 27, 1982 (T2. 78,88, 95; T3. 12).
Meanwhile, Billy and Gary Poteet had jumped bail
(Rl. 77-96).

They did not appear at their May 6, 1982

arraignment (Rl. 31, 36-37).

At appellant's arraignment on

the same Clay, appellant pled not guilty to charges of
Aggravated Assault, Aggravated Robbery, and Attempt.ea Criminal
Homicide and to the newly added charge of Bail Jumping (Rl.
34).

Billy and Gary were eventually arrested in Prosser,

Washington, and were returned to Utah on May 25, 1982 ( Rl.
79).
On May 12, 1982, appellant filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming, among other things, that he
had been arrested without a warrant at his home, that he had
not been afforded a Preliminary Hearing within the statutory
30-day period (Rl. 41-47, 196-198).
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Appellant's petition was

dc:nied June 10, 1982 (Rl. 190, 195),6

On clune 13, 1982,

appc:llant escaped feom jail (T4. 6-7, 10-12).
On July 12, 1Q83, Billy, Gaey, and John Poteet all
pled guilty to Attempted Aggravated Assault, a class A
misdemeanor, pursuant to a plea haegain agreement ( Rl.
99-106).

In addition, Billy and Gaey also pled guilty to Bail

Jumping, a thied degree felony (Rl. 99, 101, 103).
were placed on peobation (Rl. 113-118).

All theee

One of the conditions

of probation was that they would eetuen voluntaeily to Utah to
testify against appellant upon appellant's appeehension and
trial (Rl. 114, 116, 118).
Appellant was subsequently aerested in Montana, and
after fighting exteadition was finally eetuened to Utah on
October 20, 1982 (T4. 10, 23).

Since appellant's odginal

counsel had withdeawn aftee negotiating the plea bargaining
agreement foe Billy, Gaey, and John Poteet (Rl. 121-126),
appellant appeaeed at the Novembee 4, 1982 headng without
counsel (Rl. 125).

At that heaeing the law fiem of Labeum and

Taylor was appointed as appellant's new counsel (Rl. 125-126).
On Decembee 9, 1982, a Peeliminaey Heaeing was held on the
charges of Bail Jumping, Escape, and Injuey to a Jail, and
appellant was bound over foe teial on each of the chaeges
(T3. 1-26; T4. 1-28).

6

Appellant's subsequent appeal to this Couet was
"Jismissed for failure to state a cause foe eelief undee Rule
6SA(f)(l), no unlawful resteaint having been alleged." Poteet
v, Garfield County Attorney, Utah, (Case No. 18883, filecr---Decernber 17, 1982)(Minute Entey).
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On January 6, 1983, Appc-llant filen a motion to
dismiss the Bail Jumping charge on the basis that a
preliminary hearing on that count had not heen heln (Rl.
158-159).

The trial court denied the motion on January 16,

1983, ruling that the motion was moot since a preliminary
hearing had been held on the Bail Jumping on December 9, 1982
( Rl. 163-164).
On January 26, l9R3, appellant, through new counsel,
again moved to dismiss for failure to hold a preliminary
hearing within thirty days (Rl. 178).

Appellant also filed a

motion to suppress the emergency field identification on the
basis that appellant had been arrested without a warrant (Rl.
179-180).
In addition, appellant sought to have the State bear
the expense of transporting to trial appellant's brothers,
Gary and Billy Poteet, residing in Grandview, Washington, and
appellant's wife, Darliss Poteet, residing in Missoula,
Montana (Rl. 185-188).

In February of 1983 appellant prepared

an affidavit of impecuniosity to the effect that he was unable
to pay the per diems and mileage of his relatives, that
counsel advised him that the evidence of his brothers was
material to his defense of self-defense, and that he could oot
safely proceed to trial without them (Rl. 192-193).

This

affidavit, however, was not filed with the court until the day
of trial and had not been subscribed before a notary public
(Tl. 25).
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On February 18, 1983, appellant filed an Affidavit
of Bias and Prejudice against the Honorable Don

v.

Tibbs on

Lhe ground that Judge Tibbs had denied appellant's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in a hearing held June 10, 1982
(Rl. 194-199).

The Honorable Allen B. Sorenson found the

affidavit insufficient in several particulars and denied the
application for disqualification of Judge Tibbs (Tl. 10; Rl.
200).
Appellant's trial was held February 28, 1983 and
March 1, 1983 on the charges of Aggravated Assault, Aggravated
Robbery, and Attempted Criminal Homicide (Tl. 5-6).

Before

trial proceedings began, the trial court ruled on appellant's
pretrial motions.

The trial court denied appellant's motion

to dismiss for failure to hold a preliminary hearing within
thirty days, ruling that the issue was moot (Tl. 17).7

The

trial court also denied appellant's motion to suppress, ruling
that exigent circumstances existed, justifying the warrantless
arrest of appellant (Tl. 18, 346-349).
The trial court also refused to transport
appellant's out-of-state relatives to trial at State expense
because appellant's brothers had agreed as a condition of
probation to return voluntarily to testify at appellant's
trial that appellant had been the instigator of the assault
(Tl. 20-25, 489-492).

The trial court also noted that

1 Appellant made the same motion at the March 11, 1983 Bail
Jumping trial, and the trial court again denied the motion
( T2. 4-6).
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appellant had not establishecl that the testimony of his wife
and brothers was material to his defense and that since they
were relatives of appe::.lant, appellant shou::.d at range fot
their presence if their testimony was material (Tl. 23-24).
After the trial court hacl denied the motion, appellant
submitted his affidavit of impecuniosity relating to the
motion for compulsory process for his out-of-state relatives,
The trial court ordered the affidavit filed, but let stand his
order denying the requested compulsory process on the ground
that the filing of the affidavit was not timely (Tl.

25).

The jury found appellant guilty of Aggravated
Assault (Tl. 547; Rl. 244-246,

260, 262).

In a separate jury

trial helcl March 11, 1983, appellant was found guilty of Bail
Jumping (T2. 136; R2. 64).

For each of the above convictions,

appellant was sentenced on March 31. 1983 to serve consecutive
terms of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison and
to pay a fine of SS,000.00 (Rl.

268; R2.

37).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS
TO SECURE, AT STATE EXPENSE, THE
ATTENDANCE OF APPELLANT'S RELATIVES WHO
WERE RESIDINS OUT OF STATE.
Appellant claims the tria::. court erced in refusing
to secuce, at State expense, the attendance at trial of
appellant's brothecs Billy and Gacy Poteet, who were cesirling
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out of state.

Appellant contendR that their testimony was

essential to establish appellant's defense of self-defense and
the community atmosphere that oslensbily lead to appellant's
]Umping bail.
It must be noted at the outset that appellant never
filed a pi:oper motion under the "Uniform Act to Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Pi:oceedings" (Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-1 through 5 (1953), as
amended) which is the process by which out-of-state witnesses
are obtained to testify in criminal trials.

He merely filed

what. was captioned a "Motion for Subpoenas" under Utah Code
Ann.§ 77-35-14 (1953), as amended, which is the local
subpoena rule of the Code of Criminal Procedure which, of
coui:se, is limited to compelling" the attendance of a witness
from anywhere in the state."
added)

(Rl. 185-188).

(Section 77-35-14(e))

(emphasis

This motion made no request that the

defense witnesses be obtained at State expense.

After this

motion was denied, appellant waited until the first day of
trial and filed an affidavit pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
21-5-14 (1953),

seeking an ordei: of the court to subpoena

his defense witnesses at State expense (Rl. 192-193; Tl. 25).
Again, this statute is not the procedural vehicle for securing
the attendance of out-of-slate witnesses.

Moreover,

appellant's affidavit lacked a specific date and was not
notacized (Rl. 192-193).

Thus, appellant's own failures to

ptoperly and timely apply for an order to obtain the
attendance of his out-of-state witnesses, and to obtain them
-1 7-

at State expense justifies the action of the lowet cou,t
denying appellant's cequest.
A defendant has a constitutional right to
pcocess, but that right is not absolute.
Oc.

App. 479, 493 P.2d 1393 ( 1972).

State v.

Peyton, R

The gi:anting oi: denial

rif

an application for compulsoi:y process fo.- out-of-state
witnesses is within the sound disc.-et ion of the court.

Utah

Code Ann.§ 77-21-3 (1982); People v. Rich, 313 N.W.2d 364
(Mich. App. 1981); State v.
1980).

Ivory,

609 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App.

Disccetion is abused only where no reasonable man

would take the view adopted by the trial court, Jankelson v.
Cisel, 3 Wash. App. 139, 473 P.2d 202 (1970), ot where the
tcial court in view of all the ciccumstances acts acbitrat:ily
and exceeds the bounds of ceason, i:esulting in substantial
injustice.

Poi:tec v. Poi:tec, 473 P.2d 538 (Mont. 1970).

Unde.- the ciccumstances of the instant case, the tcial court's
i:efusal to ocder the attendance of appellant's out-of-state
witnesses at State expense was not an abuse of disci:etion.
The tcial court denied appellant's cequest
because Billy and Gacy Poteet had both agreed, as a condition
of pcobation, to ceturn voluntarily to testify at appellant's
trial that appellant had been the instigate.- of the assault
(Tl. 492; Rl. 114, 116).

Thus, their testimony would hardlv

be characterized as "material" to the defense.

The ti:ial

court also reasoned that since they were appellant's
brothers, appellant should arrange for their attendance at
trial if their testimony was indeed material to his defensr:e
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23-24).

Implicit in the tcial court's culing is the

assumption that a defendant's relatives have a vital interest
in the defendant's case and thus are not unduly burdened by
having to pay transportation and other expenses related to
their attending trial to testify on the defendant 1 s behalf.
In the instant case appellant's brothers not only would not
have been unduly bur<'lened by having to attend trial at their
own expense, but also had an affirmative duty to do so under
the terms of their probation--albeit to testify in behalf of
the state.
Utah Code Ann.

21-5-14 (1953) provi<'les that no

witness for a defendant in a criminal case shall be subpoenaed
al State expense except upon court order, and such court order
shall be made only upon affidavit of the defendant showing (1)
that the defendant is impecunious, ( 2) that counsel has
advised the defendant that the witnesses' testimony is
material to his defense, and

(3) that the defendant cannot

safely proceed to trial without the witnesses. Appellant
prepared such an affidavit dated "February, 1983" (the
specific date was not listed) (Tl. 25; Rl. 192-193), but the
affidavit was not subscribed by a notary public, and was not
filed with the court until the day of trial after the trial
court had already denied appellant's "Motion for Subpoenas" as
to appellant's out-of-state witnesses (Tl. 25; Rl.
185-188) .B

8 Again, this prior motion had not requested that the
out-of-state witnesses be obtained at State expense, it merely
requested that they be obtained by subpoena.

Appellant's filing of the

was unlime.:.y.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetls,
v. Dirring, 354 Mass. 523, 23R N.E.

in Commonwealth

2rl SOR (1968), ruled that

the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying Lhe
defendant's tardy motion for compulsory process of
out-of-state witnesses, where the mot ion was made on the fifth
day of trial after the defendant had had approximately ten
months in which to prepare for trial.

In State v. Peyton,

supra, the court upheld the denial of the defendant's motion
for compulsory process of an out-of-state witness on the
grounds that his filing the motion at the beginning of tria.:_
was untimely.

The Peyton court also found that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's
motion for continuance in connection with the request for
compulsory process in light of the fact that the tria::. had
already been continued on three occasions, al::. attributable to
the defendant's acts.
In the instant case, appel:!.ant included the names of
his brothers in his Motions for Subpoenas (Rl. 185-lRfl), hut
he did not file the requisite affidavit in support of his
request for compulsory process for the out-of-stale witnesses
at State expense until the beginning of trial (Tl. 25), anti
never filed a motion under the Uniform Acl to Secure the
attendance of out-of-state witnesses,
seq., supra).

(Section 77-21-1 el.

The trial court was understandably unwilling lo

further postpone the trial until appellant.'s bLothers cou.:.d be
brought to Utah to attend the trial
-20-

in light of the bcothers'

agi·eemenl to relurn voluntarily and the more than fifteen
month delay from the time of the assault to the time of trial
caused by appellant's jumping bail in December of 1981, and
his escaping from jail in June of 1982 (Tl. 25).

Thus, under

the circumstances, and in accordance with Dirring and Peyton,
ciced above, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to refuse to grant appellant's untimely application for
an oi·der that appellant's brothers and wife be brought to
trial al State expense.
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-5 (1953)
provides that "an affidavit to be used before any court, judge
or officer of this slate may be taken before any judge or
clerk of any court of any justice of the peace or any notary
public in this stale."

Although the statute's language is

permissive, it is well settled that an affidavit is a written
statement, under oath, sworn to or affirmed by the person
making it before some person who has authod ty to administer
an oath or affirmation.

2A C.J.S. Affidavits

§

2, pp.

435-436; Halsy v. Pat Reichenberger Lumber, Inc., 5 Kan. App.
2d 622, 621 P.2d 1021 (1981).

Furthermore, "[I]n order to

make an af f id av it, the re must be present at the same time the
officer, the affiant, and the paper, and there must be
something done which amounts to the administration of an
oath."

In re Education Association of Passaic, Inc., 117 N.J.

Suµ-r. 25'), 2Fi7, 284 A.2d 374 (1971).

See also 2A C.J.S.

Affidavits § 30, p.465; Thompson v. Self, 197 Ark. 70, 122
S.W.2d 182 (1938).
-21-

Thus, since appellant's afficlavil was nol made under
oath before a person authorized lo lake such an affidavit, the
affidavit is invalicl, and lhe trial cour·l pi:operly retusecl lu
order that appellant's oul-of-slale witnesses be suhpoenaea at
State expense.
This Court deall with a i:elaled silualion in State
v. Cox, 74 Utah 14q, 277 P. 972 ( 1929).

The clefenclant in Cox

presented an affidavit at trial supporting his request foe an
ocdec that certain witnesses he subpoenaed at State expense.
This Couct affirmed the tcial court's clenial of the demand on
the grounds that cross-examination of the clefendant revealerl
that he was in fact not unable to beac the expense of bringing
the witnesses to the ti:ial and that the affidavit failecl to
make the cequiste showing of materiality of the witnesses'
testimony.
In the instant case, although the tcial couct culed
that appellant was impecunious (Tl.

24), the couct pcopedy

denied appellant's request on the grounds that his bcothecs
had an affirmative cluty to attend appellant's tcial under the
teems of theic probation (Tl. 492; Rl. 114, 116).
Fucthecmore, appellant's affidavit suffered nol merely from an
insufficient showing of matecialily bul fcom complete
invalidity since it was not made undec oath befoce a person
authorized to take such an affidavit.
Thecefoce, the tcial couct pcopecly denied
appellant's demand.

-2 2-

POINT II
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF
THE HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS WAS PROPERLY
DENIED.
Befoce tcial, appellant filed an Affidavit of Bias
and Pcejudice against the Honocable Don V. Tibbs on the
grounds that Judge Tibbs had previously denied appellant's
ptetition for a wdt of habeas corpus (Rl. 194-199).

In

accordance with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judge Tibbs referred the matter to the Honorable Allen B.
Sorenson, who found the affidavit insufficient and denied
appellant's motion to disqualify Judge Tibbs (Tl. 10; Rl.
200).

Appellant now objects for the first time that Judge

Sorenson did not detail the reasons underlying this
conclusion.

Apparently, no attempt was made by the defense to

ask Judge Sorenson for a clarification of the basis for his
ord<=c.
Appellant relies on Rule 52( a), Utah Rules of Civil
Pcocedure, which requires that a court find the facts
cpecifically and state sepacately its conclusions of law
theceon in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury.

But Rule 52(a) also provides that

"findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on
dtecisions of motion under Rule 12 or 5h or any other motion
exc<opt as pcovided in Rule 4l(b)."
An action is commenced by the filing of a complaint
01

the service of summons (Rule 3), while a motion is an

application foe an order (Rule 7(b)(l)).
-23-

The filing of an

Affidavit of Bias and Pcejurlice ls essentially an appllcatinri
foe an ocdec of disqualification.

Thus,

the filing nf an

Affidavit of Rias and Ptejudice is a motion rather than an
action, and Judge Sorenson's rleclsion need not be
by findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Appellant. cites not. law to the

Thet<=fore,

it was not error foe Judge Sorenson to summarily deny
appellant's motion.

POINT III
THE EMERGENCY FIELD IDENTIFICATION WAS
PROPER.
Appellant claims that he was denied du<= process of
law by being subjected to an illegal line-up on Novemb<=r 1,
1981 when Office Mosiec took him, his brothers, and his uncle
to the Cir:cle "D" Motel to be

identified by the victim.

Appellant asser:ted an identical claim in a petition for habeas
cor:pus celief, which was denied by the Sixth District Court in
a hearing held June 10, 1982 (Rl. 195-196).
upheld that denial.

This Court later

Poteet v. Garfield County Attorney, Utah

(Case No. 18883, field December 17, 1982)

(Minute Entry).

Appllant was not subjected to a line-up at the
Ciccle "D" Motel.
identif icat.ion,

Rather,

it was an emergency fie.!.d

Consequently,

the statutes governing

line-ups, cited by appellant in his bcief, are inapposit<= to
the ci ccums tances of the instant case.
Utah 2d 442, 511 P.2d 159 (1973).
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State v. Allen, 29

In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the United
States Supreme Court ruled that "a claimed violation of due
ptocess of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on
the totality of the circumstances surrounding it
at 302.

Id.

Because in Stovall one of the assailant's victims was

dead and the other critically injured, and feared to be close
to death, the Court held that the confrontation was ceasonable
under the circumstances.
The ciccumstances of the instant case ace cemackable
similar.

The victim, Rodney Jones, when discoveced, had a

weak pulse fcan the loss of so much blood; his bceathing was
shallow; and he faded in and out of consciousness (Tl. 330,
343-345, 386, 406).

Officec Mosiec feaced that Jones might

not live (Tl. 343-345).

Thus, undec the ciccumstances, it was

impecative that Officec Mosiec allow Jones an immediate
oppoctunity to confcont and identify the suspects Jones had
named.
Appellant acgues that the eighteen houc delay fcom
the time of the assault to the time of the confcontation
mitigates against characterizing the confcontation as an
emergency field identification.
for his pcoposition.

Appellant cites no authodty

Fucthecmoce, he and the othec thcee

suspects we ce bcough t to the C ice le "D" Motel within an houc

oi two of the time that Jones was discoveced in his coom {Tl.
144, 159, 171. 333).

Thus, the confcontation was conducted as

soon as ceasonably possible under the circumstances, and
appellant's rights wece not infcinged.
-2 5-

POINT IV
THE TIME FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING ON THE
CHARGE OF BAIL JUMPING WAS EXTFJHJF:f) POR
GOOD CAUSE.
Appellant claims that he was denied due process of
law because he was not afforded a preliminary hearing on the
chacge of Bail Jumping until December: 9, 1982.
In December: of 1982, aflec his pceliminary heatcing
on the charges of Aggcavated Assault, Aggravated Robber·y, and
Attempted Criminal Homicide, appellant moved his family ftcom
Escalante, Utah to Califocnia (T2. 75-77, 87, 92-93; T3.
15-19, 23; Rl.

45).

Consequently, appellant failed to appear

as ocdered at his January 7, 1982, arraignment hearing (T2.
92-93, 98-99; T3. 10, lf;).

On January appellant was arrested

in San Luis Obisbo, California (T2. 88, 94; T3. 10).
Appellant fought extradition and was not returned to Utah
until April 27, 1982 (T2, 78, 88, 95; T3. 12).
On May 8, 1982, appellant was arraigned on the
original three charges and a new charge of Bail Jumping (Rl.
34-35).

Appellant plea "Not Guilty" to all four charges (Rl.

34).
On June 13, 1982, only three days aft.etc his petition
foe a writ of habeas corpus had been denied (Rl. 190, 195),
appellant escaped from jail (T4. 6-7, 10-12).

Appellant was

later: discovered in Montana and after again fighting
extcadition, was finally returnecl to Utah on October 20, 1982
( T4 • 10 , 2 3) •
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At a November 4, 1982 hearing, new counsel for
appellant was appointed (Rl. 125-127).

At that hearing the

also nirected that any request for preliminary hearing
on the three new charges of Bail Jumping, Escape, and Injuring
a Ja.i.l should be referred to the Circuit Court (Rl. 125).

on

December 1, 1982 appellant moved to dismiss the Bail Jumping
chai:ge on the grounns that he had not been afforded a
pi:e:iminary hearing on that charge (Rl. 158-159).

The

preliminary hearing on the Bail Jumping charge was held on
December 9, 1982 (T3. 1-26; T4. 1-28).

Consequently, at the

January 6, 1983 hearing on the motion to Clismiss and other
motions, the trial court ruled that the matter was moot (Rl.
163-164).

Appellant's subsequent motions to the same effect

were denied on the same grounds (Tl. 17; T2. 4-6).
Unde c the ci rcurnstances, appellant was not denied
due pi:ocess of law.

By pleading to the Bail Jumping charge at

the May 8, 1982 arraignment hearing, appellant implicitly
waived a preliminary hearing on that charge.
Gustaldi,

41 Utah 63, 123 P. 897 (1912); Pope

State v.

v. Turner, 30

Utah 2d 286, 517 P.2d 536 (1973).8

8 Although,

in contrast to the circumstances in Gustaldi and
Pope, appellant moved before trial to dismiss the Bail Jumping
chai:ge foe failure to hold a preliminary hearing on that
charge, the trial court in all likelihood considered the
to be a request for such a hearing in accordance with
the coui:t's discretion at the November 4, 1982 hearing.
Significantly, appellant did not object to the failure to hold
a pteliminary hearing until nearly eight months after pleading
lo the Bail Jumping charge, and once he raised the objection
he was afforded a hearing within ten days.
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Even assuming that appellant did not waive the
preliminary hearing, the preliminaty heating was continuPd fa,
good cause as provided fot

in Utah Code Ann.

77-37-7(4)(cl.

The delay from the May 8, 1982 hearing at which appellant was
first charged with Bail Jumping to the December 9, 1982
preliminary hearing on that charge was due primarily to
appellant's escape from jail on June 13, 1982.
This Court in State v. Bradshaw, Utah (Case Nos.
18255 and 18430,

filed February 9, 1984), ruled that a l70-day

delay in the holding of a preliminary hearing was not an abuse
of the "good cause" ex tens ion since the delay was the resu::.t
of the defendant's own actions and concerns.

In the case at

bar, the delay was likewise a result of appellant's actions
and conduct.
Thus, there was good cause to extend the time for
the preliminary hearing, and the resulting delay did not deny
appellant's right to due process of law.

POINT V
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT AT HIS
RESIDENCE WAS PROPER.
Appellant contends that under Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980), Officer Mosier's arrest of appellant

without a warrant at his place of reside nee was improper, and
thus all evidence of the line-up identification and follow,ng
processes should have been suppressecl by the trial court.
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Appellant moved to suppi:ess this evidence on the
same grounds befoi:e ti:ial (Rl. 179-180).

The ti:ial coui:t

denied the motion on the gi:ounds that exigent cii:cumstances
existed, justifying the wai:i:antless ai:i:est (Tl. 18, 346-349).
Appellant's i:eliance on Payton is misplaced.

When,

as in the instant case, the pei:sons to be ai:i:ested answei: the
dooc or come outside the cesidence, no warant is required
because thece has been no entry of private premises.

United

States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1981); Waldrop v.
State, 424 So.2d 1345 (Ala. Cr. app. 1982); People v. Morgan.
113 Ill.App. 3d 543, 447 N.E.2d 1025 (19A3); LaFave, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE§ 6.1 (Supp. 1984).
Thecefore, since appellant and his co-suspects all
voluntacily came outside theii: residence, the later
warrantless arrest was proper, and appellant's motion to
suppcess was propei:ly denied.
Even assuming that a warrant was required to arrest
appellant and the others outside their home absent exigent
ciccumstances in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Payton, such exigent cirucmstances existed in the case at bar.
The victim had been seriously injured and was feared to be
close to death or losing consciousness (Tl. 343-345).

Officer

Mosiei: hacl probable cause to believe that appellant, his
brothers, and his uncle had committed the assault since the
victim named them as his assailants (Tl. 329, 349, 360).
Finally, Officer Mosier believed that appellant and the other
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Poteets wece tcansienls living in Escalante only temporarily
(Tl. 343-345; TS. 11).

Thus, undec lhe ciccurnstances,

it woulrl have heen

unceasonable lo cequice that Officer Mosier· obtain a warrant
in ocdec lo accesl appellant anrl

the his r·elatives so that he

could take them to the Cii:le "D" Motel foi: the emecgency field
identification.

Thecefoce, the lr:-ia1 cour:-t's nenial of

appellant's motion to suppi:ess was also pi:opei: under this
analysis.

POINT VI
THE EVIDENCF. ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CONVICTION.
Appellant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to suppor:-t his conviction of Aggi:avaled Assault
since the pcosecution pr:-oduced no evidence that appellant used
a deadly weapon in the assault.
This Coui:l has used the fo1lowing standar:-d of review
in considecing a challenge lo the sufficiency of the evidence:
This Coucl will nol lightly ovectui:n lhe
findings of a jui:y.
We must view the
evidence pi:opecly pi:esented al li:ial in
the light most favoi:able to the jucy' s
vecdict, and will only intei:fei:e when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that a i:easonable man could not possibly
have ceached a vei:a ict beyond a i:easonble
doubt.
We also view in a light most
favocable to lhe jui:y's vei:dict those
faults which can be i:easonably infer:-r:-ed
fr:-om the evidence pi:esentea to it.
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Slale v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, <l45 (1982)

(citations

ommitled).
Appellant was convicted of Aggravated Assault in a
juty trial held February 28, 1983 and March 1, 1983 (Tl. 5-6).
There are two elements to the offense:
Ann.

Ii;

first, under Utah Code

76-5-102 (1978), there must be either "(a)

[a]n

attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury
to another; or (b)

[a] threat, accompanied by a show of

immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another"
(emphasis added); and second, under Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-103

(l978), the assailant must either "(a) • • • intentionally
cause

] serious bodily injury to another;

(b)

• • • use

[ ] a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury" (emphasis added).

The

information charged the offense under theory (a) of Section
76-5-103 (Rl. 154), a theory which appellant does not even
challenge on appeal.

Even so, under the disjunctive wording

of the statute, lack of evidence as to use of a deadly weapon
in the assault is not necessary to sustain a conviction of
Aggravated Assault.

Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial

was more than sufficient to establish that appellant
attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily
injury to the victim, Rodney Jones, and that appellant either
intended to cause Jones serious bodily injury or used such
rnc:ans or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury.
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Appellanl and lhe olhet Poleets were seen enlc-ting
Jone's motel room on lhe aflernoon ot the assault (Tl. 140,
218-219, 322-323,

367).

They were later heard

God Damn sure tore lhat room up, TV and all"

to say, " We

(Tl. 240-248).

Jones was discovered the next mor·nin'] in his molel

room

unconscious, batlered, and covered wilh blood (Tl. 141, 159,
171-172).

Jones named and identified appellanl as one of his

assailants (Tl.

289, 329, 339, 349, 358,

360).

Appellant finally claims, that the evidence <lid not
establish that Jones sustained a serious bodily injury as
defined in Ulah Code Ann.

76-1-601(9)

(miscited by

appel.:.ant), which slates that "'Serious bodily injury' means
bodily injury that creales or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ or creates a substanlial risk of
death."
The evidence established lhat the assault
Jones unconscious for approximately eighteen hours (Tl. 282,
363, 422).

His face, ears, and left eye were bruised, ancl he

had a small skull fracture (Tl. 420-421, 428, 431-432).

Dr.

Henrie, Jones's attending physician, teslified that Jones hac
suffered a concussion and a conlusion of the brain, and that
Jones was somnolent (Tl. 422-423, 439).

Dr. Henrie fucther

testified that Jones had been in danger of death by aspiratior;
of his vomit while unconscious (Tl. 424).

Finally, Jones's

mentation and memory were seriously impaired by the assault
(Tl. 287, 422, 426, 439).
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The above evidence amply supports the conclusion
that Jones's injury either caused a protracted impairment of
his mEontation and mEomory or crEoated a substantial risk of
dEoath.

Thus, th" EovidEonc" was sufficient to support

apfl"llant's conviction of Aggravated Assault.

CONCLUSION
For the abov" stated reasons, appellant's
convict ions should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of March,

1984.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. !)()RIUS
Assistant Attorney General
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I heceby cecti fy that I mailed a tt·ue and exact copy
of the focegoing Bcief, postage pcepaid to James L. Shumate,
attocney foe appellant, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah

--K-84720-0623, this __,___day of Match, l9R4.

